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Abstract:  
This article considers the usefulness of low-carbon scenarios in public decision-making. They may be 
useful as a product-oriented trajectory. The scenarios on the agenda of the 2013 Energy Debate in 
France belong to this category. But a scenario may also be process-oriented, in the sense that its 
scripting process helps build consensus and a minimum level of agreement. We have scripted 
scenarios using a codevelopment method, involving about 40 stakeholders from the private and 
public sectors, and from the state: NGOs, consumer groups, trade unions, banks and local 
authorities. They selected policies they considered acceptable for achieving 75% greenhouse gases 
emission reductions in 2050. These policies were then integrated in the Imaclim-R France technico-
economic simulation model, as part of a high or moderate acceptability scenario. In the first case 
emissions were cut by between 58% and 72% by 2050; in the second case by between 68% and 81%, 
depending on the energy price assumptions. All these measures benefited jobs and economic 
growth, swiftly and durably cutting household spending on energy services. This offers a solid basis 
for gaining acceptability for low carbon trajectories; the process constitutes also a framework for 
consolidating collective learning centring on the acceptability of climate policies. 
1. Introduction 
The energy trajectories for achieving France’s Factor-Four (F4) target – a fourfold cut in greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions by 2050 compared with 1990 – have prompted lively debate. As part of the 
energy debate in France in 2013, the second working group (Arditi et al., 2013) was tasked with 
comparing and assessing existing scenarios in order, if possible, to define a trajectory for energy 
transition. About 15 scenarios, developed by very diverse bodies1 with sometimes very conflicting 
interests, were tabled. It proved impossible to reconcile their respective views so these exercises 
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were of little use to public decision-makers and had only limited value for raising awareness of the 
need for energy transition. 
Starting from this observation, the present article seeks to review the usefulness of low-carbon 
scenarios. They may serve a wide range of goals, which fall into two main categories: product-
oriented or process-oriented scenarios (Wilkinson and Eidinow, 2008; Hulme and Dessai, 2008; 
O’Neill et al, 2008; O’Neill and Nakicenovic, 2008). In the first case, the prime objective is the 
scenario itself and its content in terms of a technology and energy trajectory. In the second case, 
what matters is the process itself used to bring about the scenario, the aim being to achieve 
consensus, minimum levels of agreement or at the very least a common understanding of the stakes. 
The scenarios debated in France in 2013 were tabled as finished products and belong in the first 
category. Framed by energy experts and engineers they focus largely on the technological aspects of 
transition (Mathy et al, 2011), about which the advocates and opponents of many ‘low-carbon’ 
technologies are in dispute. Controversy centres on wind power (Nadai and Labussière, 2009), 
biofuels, nuclear energy (Bonneval and Lacroix-Lanoë, 2011), shale gas (IFOP, 2013), carbon capture 
and sequestration (Ha Duong et al, 2009), and even electric vehicles (Thiel et al, 2012). Furthermore, 
a large number of low-carbon scenarios are based on the assumption of seamless penetration by the 
relevant technologies, guided when appropriate by a single, cross-the-board carbon price 
(Söderholm et al, 2011).  
Technological solutions are necessary but not sufficient to meet long-term low-carbon targets 
(Edenhofer et al., 2010). Far-reaching shifts in energy demand are also needed, involving measures to 
control energy demand and improve energy efficiency, but also changes in urban planning. The price 
of carbon on its own cannot drive this transition and a mix of policies will be required (Fischer and 
Newell, 2004; Lécuyer and Quirion, 2013). Yet these too raise issues of acceptability which must be 
taken into account when assessing low-carbon trajectories, because poor acceptability can slow 
down deployment of such policies: witness the carbon tax (Hourcade, 2012), renewable-energy 
support mechanisms (Bökenkamp et al, 2008), demand-response policies (Wolsink, 2012) or 
restrictions on the use of private motor vehicles (De Groot and Steg, 2006), among others. 
The concept of acceptability is based on individual factors, linked to psychology and value (Steg et al, 
2005), but also institutional and procedural factors (Devine-Wright, 2008). Its scope may be enlarged 
by a better understanding of the subject, by co-development, compensation or redistribution 
systems. Greater transparency in the decision-making process is a pre-requisite, through 
participatory approaches involving the general public and stakeholders. These practices have 
developed in many fields of environmental protection (Renn, 1999; Van Asselt and Rijkens-Klomp, 
2002; Wilcox, 2003; Hulse et al, 2004; Pahl-Wostl, 2002; Patel et al, 2007) particularly energy and 
climate change (Dorfman et al, 2013). 
As recommended by Garb et al (2008), we propose here to use a co-development method to script 
low-carbon scenarios with stakeholders, focusing on the issue of the acceptability of policies and 
technologies. All the policies identified as being acceptable are then aggregated in the Imaclim-R-
France general-equilibrium model, for quantitative economic and environmental assessment. Only a 
few examples of methodologies combining stakeholder panels and economic modelling exist and 
either they do not focus on climate policy acceptability (Schmid and Knopf, 2012) or there is no direct 
link between the participatory process and economic modelling (EC, 2011; de Perthuis et al., 2011). 
Section 2 presents the methodology developed and the Imaclim-R-France model. Section 3 presents 
results concerning: (i) the acceptable policies considered by stakeholders; (ii) the scripting protocol to 
define a ‘high-acceptability’ (HA) scenario and a ‘moderate-acceptability’ (MA) scenario; and (iii) the 
quantitative assessment of the two scenarios. Section 4 discusses the way in which the process could 
evolve towards a set of acceptable policies of broader scope, more likely to achieve the Factor-Four 
target. Section 5 summarizes the main results, presents policy implications and concludes with a 
review of the pros and cons of the participatory process. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Collaborative scenario-scripting process 
Three days of consultations (for residential, transport and electricity respectively) sought to gauge 
the degree of acceptability of low-carbon climate and technology policies for the various 
stakeholders. The priority when selecting the latter was to engage stakeholders with sufficiently 
diverse and contrasting positions. Diversity is critical for enhancing learning processes on complex 
issues so it was important that a variety of perspectives, including marginal views, should be 
presented in a balanced way2. The selection process was based on the grid developed by Mendelow 
(1991), mapping their level of interest in action against their power, the aim being to bring together 
players from each of these sectors actively involved in deciding, implementing and funding policies, 
or in upholding end-user interests. As this approach cannot be applied in complete isolation, 
interviews with professionals from each sector were used to endorse the resulting matrix. 
Stakeholders included representatives of local authorities, consumer groups, professional 
federations, public and private operators, banks and NGOs3. As the aim was to enable each of the 
stakeholders to have a say, an upper limit of 15 participants was set for each workshop. The list of 
stakeholders is available in Appendix B. No document apart from the description of the project was 
sent to stakeholders before the workshop. Debate was fuelled by a presentation of the stakes for 
changing patterns of energy consumption and GHG emissions, with sector-specific studies of policies 
capable of altering existing dynamics. Drawing on a review of the scientific literature the project 
team selected measures and technologies to frame sector-specific questionnaires. The aim of these 
questionnaires was to assess the acceptability level of measures or technologies for each player but 
panellists had the opportunity to suggest measures outside these lists and other design options. Each 
measure was extensively debated and design options were discussed in such a way as to overcome 
obstacles for acceptability if possible. It was important that stakeholders should not see the concept 
of acceptability with a professional bias, but rather in a socially pro-active light: would a policy, 
depending on the yet-to-be-decided design options for its deployment (scope for compensation, for 
instance), have acceptable impacts for economic players and consumers in order to achieve the 
Factor-Four target? It is nevertheless hard to be certain that everyone’s answers reflected this 
stance. Given the number of stakeholders it was not possible to subject the answers to econometric 
                                                          
2
 For example, for the power sector, stakeholders as contrasted as Electricité de France (incumbent operator) 
and the CLER (NGO promoting renewables) were part of the process. 
3
 The same categories of stakeholders took part in the Grenelle de l’Environnement, an innovative political 
process initiated in 2007 in France in order to frame long-term decisions for the environment. It hosted 
discussions on ecology and sustainability between all the relevant social stakeholders. 
processing, but the degree of agreement between stakeholders on the acceptability of the various 
measures was calculated. This was assessed by the proportion of stakeholders supporting a measure. 
Two levels were selected: high-acceptability with 75% stakeholder support; and moderate-
acceptability, with 50% support.  
2.2. The Imaclim-R-France hybrid model 
Imaclim-R-France4 is a computable general-equilibrium model belonging to the Imaclim family of 
models developed by Cired (Waisman et al, 2012a; Sassi et al, 2010; Crassous et al, 2006). It is a 
hybrid model which represents, year by year from 2004 to 2050, simultaneous changes in technology 
systems and the economy. Given the limitations of inter-temporal equilibrium models, which 
describe a stabilized economic trajectory, with optimal allocation of investments, Imaclim-R uses a 
recursive architecture to represent both the long-term growth engine (demographic growth and 
labour productivity) and the various forms of short-term friction which may arise (faulty forecasting, 
incomplete use of production factors, inertia at various levels – equipment, technology, preferences, 
trade or capital flows). Economic growth is thus described as a succession of static equilibriums, 
representing for each year an economic balance sheet (production, consumption, international 
trade) through a Walrasian equilibrium. The economy’s dynamic is represented by sector-specific 
models reflecting shifts in technology and stocks of production factors (capital, labour, natural 
resources), thus fuelling gradual growth between each static equilibrium (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: The recursive and modular structure of the IMACLIM-R model 
Each static equilibrium does not describe the collective optimum of production taking account of the 
available technology. On the contrary the equilibrium is constrained in a sub-optimal situation by the 
inertia of equipment and the imperfect allocation of investments between sectors, entailing for 
example surplus production capacity in some sectors and under-capacity in others, thus causing 
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 Further information on the model is given in supplementary material. 
tension on prices and volume, a lack of full employment due to insufficient flexibility in the labour 
market, distortions caused by previously existing taxes or indeed allowance for the behavioural 
routines of economic agents.  
The dynamics of the economy is governed by endogenous descriptions of capital accumulation and 
technical change. Capital accumulation is given by investment by firms, household savings and 
international capital flows. The cross-sector distribution of investments is governed by expectations 
of sectoral profitability subject to imperfect foresight and technical conditions as described in sector-
specific reduced forms of technology-rich models. Imperfect foresight is a consequence of 
uncertainty about future relative prices, final demand and investment profitability, other non-energy 
prices (land and real estate) and non-economic determinants of public decisions in transportation 
and urban planning. At a given date, agents have limited information about the future and shape 
their expectations on the basis of past and current trends (adaptive expectations). Under such semi-
myopic foresight, installed capital resulting from past investment decisions may not be suited to 
future economic conditions. However, it cannot be renewed overnight due to inertia and acts as a 
constraint on adaptability to variations in economic conditions (activity levels and prices). 
The economy is broken down into 13 sectors: energy (crude oil, refined oil, gas, coal, electricity), 
transport (road transport of goods, shipping by sea and inland waters, air transport, collective 
passenger transport), construction, energy-intensive industry, agriculture and services. Energy is 
represented in values and physical quantities enabling the respective roles of each energy sector to 
be isolated, as well as their interaction with the rest of the economy. The use of physical variables 
(number of motor vehicles, collective dwellings or individual houses, annual energy efficiency of 
technologies, etc.) enables rigorous integration of sector-specific data related to the impact of 
economic incentives on final demand and technology systems, and dialogue with non-modellers.  
The agents represented displayed the following specific patterns of behaviour in the dynamic 
modules:  
- In the residential sector the behaviour of the owners of dwellings is modelled using 
generalized cost functions (Giraudet et al., 2012) taking into account investments in thermal 
retrofitting and new heating equipment, depending on the efficiency, resulting energy 
savings discounted over the equipment’s lifetime, and intangible costs reflecting the 
imperfect nature of information. Discount rates specific to each type of ownership (owner-
occupier, landlords of individual or collective dwellings, social housing organizations) allow 
the ‘landlord-tenant dilemma’ to be represented, as well as the difficulty of renovating 
collective dwellings. The increase in the quantity and quality of renovation reflects changes in 
the relative return on various levels of ambition in thermal renovation, induced by rising 
energy prices and supported by falling renovation costs through learning-by-doing. 
- The model of the electricity sector (Bibas and Mathy, 2011) represents development of 
additional capacity in line with forecasts of changing demand and the shape of the load 
profile, either from a planning perspective (overall cost minimization), or from that of 
project-owners (payback period minimization or return on investment maximization). The 
model represents a wide range of technologies (coal and gas with or without carbon capture 
and storage (CCS), nuclear, solar, wind, biomass and hydro) with their technical and 
economic specifications, and an hourly load profile. 
- Spatial mobility and share of transport modes (Waisman et al, 2012b) are the result of 
maximizing the utility function subject to the dual constraint of income and time-budget 
(Zahavi and Talvitie, 1980) to capture the connections between final demand, and 
infrastructure and equipment availability. The possible modes are private cars, collective land 
and air transport, and green modes. Building new infrastructure for one of these transport 
modes reduces congestion and increases the speed of travel by this mode which is taken into 
account in the time-budget. The efficiency of the fleet of cars depends on which technology 
households choose when purchasing a vehicle and technical progress. The vehicle fleet is 
broken down into generations, depending on the year they entered service and five types of 
technology: conventional or hybrid (both of which may be efficient or standard), and electric. 
The specifications of each of these technologies vary over time in line with technical 
advances. Each year, the technological make-up of the new generation of vehicles is the 
result of agents choosing from a range of explicit technologies, comparing for each available 
technology, the discounted average cost associated with producing one vehicle-kilometre. 
- Freight demand (Waisman et al, 2012b) is obtained by aggregating demand for goods 
transport in each productive sector. It is directly related to modes of consumption and the 
structure of the economy, and only slightly sensitive to the price of energy, modal choices 
being dictated to a larger extent by logistic options and supply-chain organization. Changes in 
the energy efficiency of maritime or air transport are exogenous, whereas the energy 
efficiency of land (road and rail) transport depends on a fuel-price elasticity of -0.4. 
Variations in energy consumption simultaneously reflect technology changes, modal shifts (in 
particular freight shifting from road to rail) and changes affecting the sector’s structural 
components. 
- In other sectors, in addition to autonomous technical progress calibrated on previous trends, 
variations in energy prices including a possible carbon tax induce (with imperfect foresight on 
energy-price evolution affecting investment decisions) additional gains in energy efficiency 
and energy substitution. 
The model thus shows how climate policies such as carbon taxation, incentives for the thermal 
renovation of housing, energy-efficiency regulation for equipment or transport-infrastructure 
policies, among others, impact on the decisions and behaviour of agents. Incentive policies are 
directly integrated in investment costs and energy prices, while the energy-efficiency coefficients of 
the various generations of capital goods include the effects of regulation. 
3. Results 
3.1. Scenario definition 
In this part we describe the sector-specific workshops with the stakeholders5, detailing the sector-
specific issues addressed and analysis of the questionnaires. The latter reveal the degree of support 
for policies and technologies summarized in Figure 2, which leads to definition of the two scenarios. 
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 These workshops did not deal with a paradigm shift in patterns of consumption such as the emergence of 
generalized preferences for a more frugal way of life. Such considerations are beyond the notion of 
acceptability as defined in the project. The resulting scenarios may consequently seem conservative compared 
with some visions describing a real paradigm shift. 
  
Figure 2: Policy acceptability (red bars mark 50% and 75% stakeholder support)
3.1.1. Acceptable policies in the residential sector 
In 2010 the residential sector in France was responsible for 30% of final-energy consumption, two-
thirds of which were due to heating. More than half the existing housing stock dates from before the 
introduction of the first regulations on thermal-efficiency in 1975, but more than two-thirds of the 
housing stock which will be available in 2050 has already been built. The challenge for the 
construction sector, over and above stricter thermal-efficiency regulations for new buildings, is to 
speed up and raise the targets for renovating existing buildings. Furthermore, with regard to new 
buildings, the Grenelle de l’Environnement6 approved ambitious thermal-efficiency regulations: low-
energy buildings] starting in 2012 (50 kWh/m2/year) and energy-plus building  certification starting 
in 2020. 
The majority of stakeholders endorsed the conclusions of Giraudet et al. (2012), namely that 
incentive instruments alone (zero-interest loans for thermal retrofitting or tax credits for the 
purchase of energy-efficient equipment) would not be sufficient to achieve the ambitious energy 
consumption reduction required. Even if thermal-efficiency renovation ultimately shows a return, the 
priority for households is thermal comfort (Maresca et al., 2009). These incentive tools are 
nevertheless necessary and the associated targets must be raised. Among others, we follow the 
proposals of Callonec and Nauleau (2012) for a 40% increase in the level of sustainable-development 
tax credits.  
To fully understand the dynamics of action on thermal renovation the stakeholders recommend a 
specific approach for each type of dwelling. 
- For individual houses compulsory retrofitting would be moderately acceptable for reasons of 
personal freedom; it would be more cost-effective to focus on dwellings with poorer energy 
performance. Stakeholders think it would be more acceptable and plausible to introduce 
more powerful incentive instruments, set up third-party funding systems, and provide better 
information on the benefits of thermal renovation. 
- Compulsory retrofitting in collective dwellings would be more acceptable if combined with 
financial support and provisions for reducing financial risk (energy-performance contracts, 
compulsory retrofitting funds, etc.), and if it targeted the largest buildings and those with the 
poorest performance.  
- Compulsory retrofitting does not seem necessary for social housing, providing dedicated 
financial instruments (third-party funding, energy-performance contracts and loans at 
preferential rates) are developed. Due to its governance and organisational structure this 
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part of the residential sector is the most suitable for a thermal renovation programme even 
with a 30-year return on investment. 
Specific thermal-renovation programmes will be needed to combat fuel poverty, but incremental 
block tariffs (IBT)7 seem to be a suitable response.  
3.1.2. Acceptable policies in the transport sector 
Transport accounts for 34.2% of CO2 emissions in France (of which 93% is due to road transport), 
with a 14.4% rise between 1990 and 2007. For several decades transport has registered the steepest 
growth in energy demand, with the dual feature of largely captive use of oil and low sensitivity to 
price signals (Goodwin et al, 2004), particularly in the short term. This observation highlights the 
limitations of any attempt to internalize the carbon constraint based exclusively on price signals. 
There is agreement in the literature that technological innovation has an important part to play in 
the post-carbon transition, but large-scale changes in modal structure and demand for mobility will 
also be necessary. 
Speed/GDP elasticity is a good indicator for obtaining contrasting views of shifts in spatial mobility. 
With commuters travelling further, thanks to substantial growth in the road network over several 
decades, the time budget has remained almost constant. These trends are reflected in positive 
speed/GDP elasticity. However, perpetuating past trends at a time of carbon constraint, while 
keeping the time budget constant (i.e. positive speed/GDP elasticity), would entail costs developing 
infrastructure for ‘fast’ transport modes which seem unrealistic and unacceptable. On the other 
hand, with zero speed/GDP elasticity, greater spatial mobility must go hand-in-hand with an increase 
in the time budget, which stakeholders are reluctant to accept. Individual mobility can no longer 
progress as before and efforts must consequently be made to reduce the negative externalities of 
transport, by relocating activities and developing alternatives to road transport. The stakeholders 
largely acknowledge the need to shift investment from road transport to other modes, but the 
acceptable volume of investment is subject to caution, between simply transferring funds previously 
invested in roads (€9 billion a year) at exactly the same level, or the need to mobilize additional 
investment, over and above the basic transfer (worth €9 billion a year plus an additional €9 billion). 
The proposals submitted to stakeholders regarding the level of investment in infrastructure were 
taken from Lopez-Ruiz and Crozet (2010).  
Stakeholders want a tariff scheme integrating the negative externalities of transport (withdrawal of 
fuel-tax exemption, tax on aviation fuel, eco-duty on heavy-goods vehicles and a carbon tax). Such 
measures gain acceptability among stakeholders if revenue from these new tariff policies is used to 
finance rail infrastructures and public transit. To support changes in behaviour, the drive to reduce 
the need for spatial mobility must also involve ‘soft’ measures, much as more widespread remote-
working and car-sharing schemes. 
There was consensus on the potential of technology: electric vehicles would be restricted to niche 
markets in urban areas, alongside the development of a functionality economy, with the rest of the 
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 Under an IBT scheme the tariff rises as consumption increases. A lower price is charged for the first kWh 
consumed. Above a specific threshold, a higher price is set. 
fleet consisting of conventional, internal-combustion powered vehicles and hybrid vehicles, of a 
significantly higher standard thanks to the support of an incentive-disincentive system (provided it 
came at no additional cost to the state). 
3.1.3. Acceptable policies in the electricity sector 
France is characterized by low emissions in the power sector (62 gCO2/kWh, compared with a 
European average of 347 gCO2/kWh) due to the contribution of nuclear (77%) and hydro (11%) 
energy. However, due to the weight of nuclear energy, renewable electricity (excluding hydro) 
currently represents only 2% of electricity generation. To diversify the energy mix and reduce 
dependency on nuclear energy, President Hollande decided the share of nuclear energy should be 
cut to 50% by 2025. As nuclear plants are on average nearly 30 years old, the question of replacing 
some of them with new nuclear plants, extending their service life, or indeed replacing them 
altogether with other technologies has prompted lively debate. A majority of stakeholders 
nevertheless considered that it would be acceptable to extend the service life of the most recent 
plants, while gradually downscaling the share of nuclear power in the energy mix, and encouraging 
and supporting greater use of renewable energy sources. Due to the problems posed by local 
acceptability there was no consensus on the level of development of onshore wind power. However 
there was demand for maintaining preferential feed-in tariffs to encourage take-up of renewables. 
There was broad agreement on the acceptability of improved energy efficiency and regulations 
should be drastically tightened up. To reduce the size of the rebound effect, following gains in the 
energy-efficiency of equipment, the introduction of IBT was considered acceptable. 
Long-term investment planning and the development of demand-response tools (dynamic pricing 
such as peak-rebate or time-of-use pricing) will be needed to address the problems of balancing 
supply and demand under conditions of increasingly frequent spikes in consumption, production 
capacity failing to meet peak demand, and over or under-capacity. 
3.1.4. Carbon-tax acceptability 
Several attempts have been made to implement a carbon tax in France8 and several expert reports 
(Quinet 2009, 2013; Rocard 2009) proposed guidelines for its implementation. The Quinet report 
(2009) recommended a carbon tax at a rate of €32 per tonne of CO2 in 2010, rising to €56 in 2020, 
€100 in 2030 and between €200 and €350 in 2050. These values correspond to the implicit value of 
the constraints for reducing CO2 emissions entailed by the -20% target in 2020 and the Factor-Four 
target in 2050. 
The stakeholders largely supported the introduction of a carbon tax at the rates recommended by 
the Quinet report, highlighting the importance of the tax’s progressive nature being predetermined 
over time so that economic agents could allow for it in their decisions and investment choices. This 
result, which is very different from the state of public debate on the carbon tax, is certainly due to 
the bias embodied by the stakeholders taking part in the process, generally better informed and 
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 In 2000 the Constitutional Court rejected an initial proposal. Following the Grenelle de l’Environnement a new 
project was introduced in 2009 to tackle all the diffuse emissions not covered by the European Emissions 
Trading System. A number of discounts or exemptions were announced for industry and agriculture. France’s 
Constitutional Court ruled that it would violate principles of equality because of the range of industrial 
emissions exempted. 
more aware of climate-change issues than the average person. It nevertheless bears out the basic 
challenge for the carbon tax: households and economic players must make allowance for this tax in 
their capital investments in order to reduce energy consumption and the corresponding bills. 
Three options for recycling tax revenue were proposed: payment of a lump sum to households; lower 
social charges on labour; or support for renewables and energy efficiency. On the basis of the 
responses to this question, it was not possible to single out a particular option. 
3.2. Scripting protocol 
The policies selected in the previous section were integrated in the Imaclim-R-France model as part 
of two scenarios: a high-acceptability scenario (HA) and a moderate-acceptability scenario (MA), 
respectively comprising the policies for which stakeholder support exceeded 75% and 50% (Figure 2).  
The high-acceptability scenario comprises: 
- In the residential sector, a set of financial and non-financial incentive measures designed to 
lower the cost and share the risk for the decision-maker of thermal renovation work and IBT 
for electricity; 
- In the transport sector, the penetration of energy-efficient and hybrid vehicles supported by 
an incentive-disincentive scheme – electric vehicles remaining restricted to niche markets – 
cross-the-board enforcement of fuel tax, a tariff scheme integrating the negative 
externalities of transport, ‘soft’ measures to limit forced spatial mobility and a substantial 
transfer of investment from roads to rail and urban transit; 
- In the electricity sector, measures to enhance the energy efficiency of equipment, to ‘smooth 
out’ the load profile, a reduction in nuclear power’s share of the energy mix coupled with the 
development of renewables and a 20-year extension of the service life of the most recent 
nuclear installed capacity amounting to 40 GW9; 
- A carbon tax at the rate recommended by the Quinet report (2009), with anticipation of the 
tax rate and recycling of revenue in the form of green cheques for households10.  
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 This option did not obtain 75% support but did poll the most votes. 
10
 The two other options under consideration – recycling to allow lower social charges on labour, or to support 
improved energy-efficiency and development of renewables – were also tested, but they made only a marginal 
difference to the results presented in the following part. 
The moderate-acceptability scenario includes all the high-acceptability measures with, in addition, 
further investment in alternatives to road transport, compulsory retrofitting of the housing stock, 
starting with social housing, gradually extended to achieve a steady number of renovation projects 
over time, and greater development of onshore wind farms. 
The baseline scenario (REF), with none of these policies, only includes the advances made by the 
Grenelle de l’Environnement with respect to energy-efficiency regulations for new buildings and the 
20% renewable-energy targets for 2020. The remaining technological advances and gains in energy 
efficiency are governed, in addition to autonomous technical change, by imperfect foresight affecting 
energy-price assumptions. 
The scripting protocol uses three groups of scenarios (baseline (REF), high acceptability (HA) and  
moderate acceptability (MA)) each with a total of 48 alternatives (Table 1) in order to take into 
account uncertainty regarding technological progress and changes in fossil-fuel prices. 
Table 1: Alternative assumptions for fossil-energy prices, technology costs and biofuels potential. 
Category Variants Number of 
variants 
Fossil-energy prices Median value (WEO, 2011) 
Low variant with prices 20% lower 
High variant with prices 20% higher 
3 
Nuclear investment cost Low variant : €5,000/kW 
High variant : €6,000/kW 
2 
Carbon capture and storage 
investment cost 
Low variant: an excess cost of €550 per kW 
High variant : an excess cost of €770 per kW 
(40% higher) 
2 
Renewable-energy investment 
cost 
Falling investment costs between 2010 and 
2050 for  
Low variant: 
- wind = -60% 
- photovoltaics = -65% 
High variant :  
- wind = -30% 
- photovoltaics = -30% 
2 
Biofuels Low variant: potential of 7Mtoe 
High variant : potential of either 15Mtoe 
2 
Number of alternatives 3 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 = 48 
NB : Investment cost assumptions for nuclear, carbon capture and storage and renewable energies 
are adapted from the TECHPOL database that is used for technological assumptions of the POLES 
model, a dynamic partial equilibrium model, designed for the energy sector. 
3.3. Modelling Results 
3.3.1. CO2 emissions 
Taking all the combinations for implementing policies, dependent on the baseline, high or moderate-
acceptability scenarios, leads to highly contrasting CO2 emission profiles, starting early in the 2010-50 
period (Figure 3). Within each group of scenarios, the main determinant of the 48 alternatives is 
uncertainty regarding fossil-energy prices.  
In the baseline scenario emissions in 2050 vary by a total of about 20% on either side of the 1990 
figure, depending on energy-price assumptions. In the high-acceptability scenario, emissions drop by 
2050 by between 58% and 72%; in the moderate-acceptability scenario by between 68% and 81%. So 
only the moderate-acceptability scenario can achieve the Factor-Four target, provided energy prices 
are not too low. Furthermore, starting in 2040, a surge in emissions in the electricity sector (see 
below) combined with the slowdown in emission-abatement in other sectors leads to stabilization of 
emissions between the high and moderate-acceptability scenarios. 
For 2020 the main determinant in the degree of CO2 emission-abatement is not due to any difference 
between the high and moderate-acceptability scenarios, but to energy-price assumptions: the 
smallest reductions are observed for low energy prices (down 22% on average), the largest 
reductions for high prices (down 33% on average), with a 28% drop in emissions for the median 
assumption. 
Figure 3: Variations in energy-based CO2 emissions on 1990 (overall, residential and transport). 
For simplicity’s sake, results in the following are presented for the median energy-price assumption, 
and for the most optimistic assumptions regarding technical advances, unless otherwise specified.  
Figure 4 assesses the emission-abatement trajectories of the high and moderate-acceptability 
scenarios in relation to French scenarios tabled during the 2013 energy debate. Two groups of 
scenarios stand out. The first group, located above the isoquant, comprises scenarios close to but not 
actually achieving the target with emission abatement largely due to high decarbonization of energy 
(50% to 70%) but only limited reduction in per capita final energy consumption. In the second group, 
the scenarios exceed the Factor-Four target and combine high decarbonization of energy (60% to 
80%) and substantial reduction in per capita final energy consumption (about 50%). The high-
acceptability scenario does not belong to either of these groups, emission-abatement being too low. 
The moderate-acceptability scenario, straddling the isoquant, comes close to the second group of 
scenarios. Both the high and moderate-acceptability scenarios are on the same straight line 
originating in 2012, representing equilibrium between emission-abatement due to decarbonization 
and energy efficiency. But both seem fairly conservative with regard to energy decarbonization. 
Figure 4: Distribution of emissions cuts between lower final-energy consumption and energy de-
carbonization in relation to 2012 
 
  
3.3.2. Residential sector 
For each of the assumptions regarding energy prices, the policies integrated in the high-acceptability 
scenario result in cuts ranging from 50% to 60% compared with 1990 in the residential sector. 
Compulsory retrofitting cuts emissions by a further 15% by 2050. Under the high-acceptability 
scenario financial incentives and measures to limit the risks involved in funding renovation work are 
not sufficient to achieve a massive shift to the highest levels of energy performance in existing 
buildings, except in social housing where C-grade labels11 feature largely (Figure 5). On the other 
hand, with compulsory retrofitting under the moderate-acceptability scenario all segments of the 
housing stock qualify for B-grade labels. These results are consistent with the findings of Giraudet et 
al (2012): the only means of achieving the Factor-Four target would be to impose compulsory 
retrofitting, whereas incentives on their own would severely restrict emission reductions and the 
number of thermal renovation projects. 
Figure 5: Changes in the energy efficiency of the existing housing stock 
 
  
                                                          
11
 In France, energy efficiency in the residential sector is classified according to energy labels ranking from least 
efficient (G-label for energy consumption higher than 450 kWh/m2/year) to most efficient (A-label for energy 
consumption lower than 50 kWh/m2/year). 
Figure 6: Breakdown of emission reductions (CO2 EM) in the residential sector (on 2010), between 
decarbonization of energy (DECARB), improved energy efficiency of the housing stock (ENER EFF), 
variations in population (POP) and per capita floorspace (M2/CAP). EFF- comprises G, F, E and D 
energy labels; EFF, C; and EFF+, B and A. 
 
These emission reductions are due to the combined effects of the improved energy-efficiency of 
buildings, achieved through thermal renovation work, and more widespread construction of low-
energy and energy-plus buildings, uptake of zero-carbon energy sources for residential heating, 
through the penetration of biogas, wood and electricity. Increases in per capita floorspace and 
population do not jeopardize these gains (Figure 6). 
3.3.3. Transport sector 
In the transport sector measures under the high-acceptability scenario reduce emissions in 2050 by 
between 37% and 58%, compared with 1990, depending on the assumptions for fossil energy prices. 
With the additional investment in infrastructure, other than roads, introduced under the moderate-
acceptability scenario, emission reductions ranging from 47% to 68% are achieved by 2050. 
For passenger transport, overall emissions under the baseline scenario remain constant compared 
with 2010, due to the combined effect of increased individual mobility and improvements in the 
energy efficiency of motor vehicles. Modal shares are also largely the same as at present. The policies 
introduced under the high-acceptability scenario significantly contain rising demand for transport, 
while increasing the share of collective transport. Both the high and moderate acceptability scenarios 
integrate the assumption that use of biofuels and low-energy vehicles will increase. The higher 
investment involved in the moderate-acceptability scenario is directed to developing alternatives to 
road transport (Figure 7). 
For goods transport, CO2 emissions drop by 13% by 2050 compared to 2010 in the baseline scenario, 
by 45% in the high-acceptability scenario and by 55% in the moderate-acceptability scenario. These 
emission reductions do not reflect a radical paradigm shift, given that decoupling of freight demand 
in relation to production is only 15% between 2010 and 2050. This means that with a 50% increase in 
the production index in 2010-50, demand for goods transport in both emission-reduction scenarios 
increases by about 35%. 
The other factors driving emission reductions are the penetration of biofuels which represent almost 
half the liquid fuel consumed in 2050, the enhanced energy efficiency of road transport per unit of 
transported goods driven by price signals (carbon tax, cross-the-board fuel tax and eco-duty on 
heavy-goods vehicles) and the modal shift to non-road transport induced by infrastructure 
investments. The additional gains registered by the moderate-acceptability scenario, over its high-
acceptability counterpart, are also due to an even greater modal shift (Figure 7). 
Figure 7: Trends for passenger and goods transport; modal distribution. 
 
 
3.3.4. Electricity sector and energy system 
The electricity sector is subject to a twin dynamic in the high and moderate-acceptability scenarios, 
compared with the baseline scenario: efficiency gains in the energy system as a whole and a 
significant rise in the share of electricity in the final-energy mix (Figure 8) driven by its increasingly 
competitive price compared to other energy sources in spite of the highest increase in electricity 
prices after 2035 in the high and moderate-acceptability scenarios compared to the baseline (Figures 
9 and 10) whatever the alternative. 
As a result the level of electricity production in the high and moderate-acceptability scenarios does 
not vary a great deal in relation to the present day, unlike the baseline scenario. The changes in the 
energy mix comply with stakeholder recommendations: powerful penetration by renewables, 
disappearance of coal, and a substantial drop in the share of nuclear power. From 2040 onwards 
increased use of gas is also made necessary. However at this point in time, given the cost 
assumptions, CCS is not profitable. This explains why emission reductions bottom out towards the 
end of the period in both the high and moderate-acceptability scenarios. Several options could 
prevent this surge in CO2 emissions: a higher (explicit or implicit through regulation of emissions) 
carbon price in the power sector to favour CCS technology, the larger penetration of renewable 
energies (coupled with electricity storage), or greater demand-side management and smart-grid 
development through more regulation or higher price signals. These options could be investigated 
with the implementation of an iterative loop as described in the discussion section. 
Figure 8: Energy-mix trends for electricity and final energy 
 
Figure 9: Evolution of electricity price in all alternatives of REF, HA and MA scenarios. Index 1= 
2010. Full range in grey, average value in black. 
 
Figure 10: Evolution of relative energy prices compared to electricity price in all alternatives of REF, 
HA and MA scenarios. Index 1= 2010. Full range in grey, average value in black. 
 
 3.3.5. Economic assessment 
The economic impacts of the baseline, high and moderate-acceptability scenarios are shown in figure 
11 for all the alternatives. Apart from the start of the reference period, under the high-acceptability 
scenario and assuming low energy prices, growth is always higher with the emission-reduction 
policies, more markedly so for the moderate-acceptability scenario than for its high-acceptability 
counterpart. These results are correlated with job creations. The drop in the share of household 
spending allocated to energy services (cost of thermal renovation, energy expenditure inside 
dwellings, fuel for motor vehicles and spending on other forms of transport) is significant from 2030. 
The drop is greater for the moderate-acceptability scenario than for its high-acceptability 
counterpart and for the upper energy-price assumption. In all cases household investment in 
emission-abatement is more than compensated by energy savings. However it is not possible on the 
basis of these aggregated results to assess the impact of the various policies on household budgets in 
different income categories. The issue of fuel poverty is consequently disregarded. On the other 
hand, the fall in energy consumption drastically reduces French energy imports, a drop which may 
reach €50 billion by 2030 and almost €100 billion in 2050.  
 
Figure 11: Economic assessment of HA and MA scenarios 
 
The economic gains are due to the combined positive effects of the climate policies considered in the 
high and moderate-acceptability scenarios which reduce the weight of energy in production costs 
and household budgets compared to the baseline. 
- Early carbon pricing and the pre-established progressive nature of the tax partly correct the 
sub-optimal investment decisions in the baseline scenario in a context of steadily increasing 
fossil fuel prices. This partly compensates for imperfect anticipation of increases in energy 
prices in the baseline scenario. It forces short-sighted decision-makers gradually to 
internalize constraints on fossil fuel prices and speed up learning-by-doing in carbon-
mitigation techniques. 
- Support schemes for low-carbon technologies supplement the effects of carbon pricing and 
foster early investments and endogenous improvements in low-carbon technologies. 
- Spatial planning-related policies and changes in investment decisions for long-life 
infrastructure reduce the need for mobility and feed a shift to less fossil-fuel intensive 
transport modes at a time of rising energy prices. In the baseline scenario investments in 
infrastructure favour road transport and inertia locks the transport system into fossil-fuel-
intensive transport modes.  
- In the shorter term, soft measures on transportation also reduce the need for mobility. 
Correcting the sub-optimalities in the baseline scenario thus opens the way for benefits from climate 
policies. Imperfect foresight leads to investment decisions ill-suited to future economic conditions 
(particularly rising energy prices) and inertia constrains adaptability to new economic conditions. In 
the high and moderate-acceptability scenarios, the overall impact of climate policies is to reduce the 
weight of energy in production costs and household budgets. This in turn boosts household 
purchasing power, final demand for non-energy goods, and consequently production. This leads to 
higher employment (in an imperfect labour market) and an additional increase in household 
purchasing power through higher wages. 
Such positive effects should be seen in perspective. Poorly designed climate policies could also 
exacerbate the distortions and sub-optimalities depicted in the model. This could be due to lack of 
flexibility in the labour market. This is particularly true for the need for new skills, on a very large 
scale and as quickly as possible, and for occupational retraining programmes for jobs in activities 
such as road freight transport. Credible answers for switching jobs are needed in order to avoid 
further labour-market inflexibility and energy-transition costs (Guivarch et al., 2011). 
To avoid such problems, predetermining the progressive nature of the carbon tax will be decisive in 
stabilizing the expectations of economic agents when making decisions on low-carbon investment. 
One core issue is the balance between higher carbon prices and low-carbon investments costs, on 
the one hand, and energy efficiency and technical change, on the other. If energy-efficiency gains 
and technical change are slower than depicted in the scenarios (due to inertia, labour-market 
inflexibility, or inadequate support schemes), energy savings may not compensate for the impact of 
carbon pricing and the additional costs entailed by low-carbon technologies. Household energy 
budgets and the weight of energy in production costs could therefore increase compared to the 
baseline scenario and lead to economic losses until energy-efficiency gains catch up. 
4. Discussion 
The results of the modelling process show that achieving the Factor-Four target will require more 
than just the high-acceptability policies. The following section assesses how this process could evolve 
into a broader set of acceptable policies, making it more likely to achieve the Factor-Four target. For 
this purpose we shall concentrate on the design and nature of such policies and the way new policies 
could be integrated in the process. 
 
Predictably, stakeholders’ discussions confirm that incentives are thought to be more acceptable 
than coercive measures. This result is supported by several empirical studies (Eriksson et al., 2006, 
2008; Joireman et al., 2001; Schuitema et al., 2011; de Groot and Schuitema, 2012). This is 
particularly true for the building sector with the perceived acceptability of incentives versus 
compulsory retrofitting.  
More ambitious, less acceptable policies must be implemented. The trickiest issues seem to concern 
compulsory retrofitting, the acceptable level of development of renewable energy, and the level of 
investment in rail infrastructures and collective transport.  
However procedural factors and the design of policy such as participatory approaches, institutional 
arrangements, compensation for addressing fuel-poverty issues or the creation of specific funding 
tools may enhance the acceptability of low or moderately acceptable policies. Consistency between 
policies and the stability of policy targets are also important factors. Pricing policies gain acceptability 
if revenue is used to finance climate policy or projects related to climate mitigation. Acceptability 
should not be considered as a static, embedded characteristic of specific climate policies. For 
example the design of the carbon tax is an essential factor determining its acceptability: stakeholders 
insisted on the importance of predetermining the progressive nature of the carbon tax over time so 
that economic agents could make allowance for it in their decisions and investment choices. In the 
building sector, financial support and provision for reducing financial risk are needed to enhance the 
acceptability of a national retrofitting programme. In the transport sector, the quality of public 
transport needs to improve significantly for it to become attractive. In the power sector even-handed 
procedures would be required throughout the planning and installation process, in order to deploy 
significant renewable electricity generation and transmission capacity. This should include legal 
provision for local communities to take part in such schemes, in particular financially. 
Nevertheless, the consensus-building process can define a significant set of policies that could be 
implemented more easily or shape a common vision of what needs to be done in specific sectors. 
These policies could be deployed first and their efficiency could also leverage other less acceptable 
policies. For example, early deployment of energy-efficiency measures should yield energy savings 
and reduce the future impact of a carbon tax or incremental block tariff for electricity, thus 
increasing their acceptability. In the residential sector, the implementation of provisions for reducing 
financial risk or early introduction of compulsory retrofitting of social housing could exert leverage on 
the future acceptability of cross-the-board compulsory retrofitting. 
Figure 12: Iterative process for broadening the scope of all acceptable policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An iterative loop could be added to the process (Figure 12) to adjust all the policies integrated in the 
high-acceptability scenario, on the basis of the results obtained from economic assessment of the 
policies integrated in the high and moderate-acceptability scenarios, and the gap between the 
resulting reductions and the Factor-Four target. Co-development yielding a set of acceptable policies 
with a certain degree of consensus thus constitutes a baseline starting from which new policies, 
initially thought to be less acceptable, could be reconsidered and found acceptable, then integrated 
in the high-acceptability scenario as part of a dynamic approach. This form of iterative loop would 
become part of reflexive governance (Brousseau and Dedeurwaerdere, 2012). This approach was not 
adopted for the present process due to time constraints. 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
This section summarizes the main results, presents the implications for policy and concludes with a 
review of the pros and cons of the participatory process. 
The point of departure for the research presented here was to question the goal of developing low-
carbon scenarios. Over and above the content of the technico-economic trajectory described by 
these scenarios, interest may focus on the scenario-scripting process. Here we investigate this 
approach with a view to overcoming the opposition prompted by existing scenarios and building a 
consensus or a minimum level of agreement as a basis for developing a process-oriented scenario.  
A co-development process involving about 40 stakeholders focusing on the acceptability of low-
carbon policies and technologies led to the selection of policies and technologies with high or 
moderate acceptability. The high-acceptability scenario comprises (i) in the residential sector, a set of 
financial and non-financial incentives designed to lower the cost and share the risk for the decision-
maker of thermal renovation work and incremental block tariffs for electricity; (ii) in the transport 
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sector, the penetration of energy-efficient and hybrid vehicles supported by an incentive-disincentive 
scheme, cross-the-board enforcement of fuel tax, a tariff scheme integrating the negative 
externalities of transport, ‘soft’ measures to limit forced spatial mobility and a substantial transfer of 
investment from roads to rail and urban transit; (iii) in the electricity sector, measures to enhance 
the energy efficiency of equipment, to ‘smooth out’ the load profile, a diversification of the energy 
mix through the development of renewables and a reduction in nuclear power’s share; (iv) a carbon 
tax with anticipation of the tax level and recycling of revenue in the form of green cheques for 
households. The moderate-acceptability scenario includes all the high-acceptability measures with, in 
addition, further investment in alternatives to road transport, compulsory retrofitting of the entire 
housing stock, starting with social housing and gradually extended to achieve a steady number of 
renovation projects over time, and greater development of onshore wind farms. 
By 2050 the high-acceptability scenario would yield emission reductions ranging from 58% to 72%, 
compared to 1990, depending on energy-price assumptions. Lowering the acceptability threshold to 
50% opens the way for reductions of between 68% and 81%. In every case the economic impacts of 
reduction scenarios are positive for GDP, jobs and household spending, more markedly so with more 
ambitious levels of emission-reductions. All these measures benefit jobs and economic growth, 
swiftly and durably cutting household spending on energy services. This offers a solid basis for 
gaining acceptability for low-carbon trajectories.  
The results of the modelling process show that more than just the high-acceptability policies will be 
required to achieve the Factor-Four target. Predictably, incentives are thought to be more acceptable 
than coercive measures. However procedural factors and the design of policy such as participatory 
approaches, institutional arrangements, compensation for addressing fuel-poverty issues or the 
creation of specific funding tools may enhance the acceptability of low or moderately acceptable 
policies. The trickiest issues are compulsory retrofitting, the level of investment in rail infrastructure 
and collective transport, and the level of renewable energy development. 
Nevertheless, the consensus-building process defines a significant set of policies that could be 
implemented more easily. These policies could be implemented first and their efficiency could 
leverage other less acceptable policies  
In terms of methodology an approach involving participatory scripting entails two main 
shortcomings. The first is the difficulty defining the notion of acceptability and the associated 
ambiguity due to conflicting corporatist, altruistic or individual points of view. The second relates to 
the small size of the panel. Results obtained with a panel with 15 stakeholders cannot be 
representative of a whole population or even of the economic sector with several thousand 
companies. No methodology based on a participatory and deliberative process can do this. 
But the present approach does include several very instructive aspects relevant to appraising climate 
policies, the role of scenarios and forms of governance. First of all the purpose of the co-
development process is to rise above the individual preferences of each of the players taking part by 
placing them in a situation requiring interaction and decision-making. Over and above the 
dissemination of information, co-development encourages joint production of solutions and 
collective learning. Methodologies based on focus groups are particularly relevant here. This 
approach goes further than a simple list of individual positions (or even powerful opposition), 
enlarging the number of acceptable policies through discussion on the design options for deploying 
measures. So, rather than adding yet another scenario to public debate, participatory scripting can 
confer broader legitimacy than other scenarios scripted by expert groups.  
Such a framework could be experimented at government level to build future national low-carbon 
scenarios through an iterative process (Figure 12). It could also be tested with citizen focus groups 
but this would require additional time, given the need for training in climate change, energy and 
specific sectoral issues. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A. List of scenarios in the French Energy Debate in 2013 
Table A.1: List of scenarios in the French Energy Debate in 2013 
Author Complete name Description 
negaWatt  Energy experts promoting nuclear phase out, energy efficiency 
and renewables 
Global 
Chance 
 Energy experts promoting nuclear phase out, energy efficiency 
and renewables 
Greenpeace  Environmental NGO 
WWF World Wild Fund for Nature Environmental NGO 
UFE Union Française de 
l’électricité 
Professional association of the electricity sector  
negaTep  Association of retired people from the CEA (Atomic Energy 
Commission) 
RTE  Réseau de Transport de 
l’Electricité 
Public French Transmission System Operator 
GRDF Gaz Réseau Distribution 
France 
Gas distribution company, 100% subsidiary of GDF SUEZ 
ANCRE  Alliance Nationale de 
Coordination de la Recherche 
en Energie 
French National Alliance for Energy Research Coordination, 
created by CEA (Atomic Energy Commission), CNRS (national 
Research Center) and IFP Energies Nouvelles (French Institute 
for Petroleum and new energies); 
Ademe Agence de l’Environnement 
et la Maîtrise de l’Energie 
the French environmental and energy management agency 
DGEC Direction Générale de 
l’Energie et du Climat 
French energy and climate department of the environment 
ministry 
CIRED Centre International de 
Recherche en Environnement 
et Développement 
Public research institute on environmental and energy 
economics 
 
  
Appendix B. List of stakeholders 
Table B.2: List of stakeholders 
Local authorities Ile de France (Greater Paris) regional council 
Private sector, operators GDF Suez  
Saint Gobain  
Energies Demain  
SNCF  
Réseaux Ferrés de France (RFF)  
Valéo  
Electricité de France (EDF) 
Fédération Nationale des Transports Routiers (FNTR) 
Union Française d’Electricité (UFE)  
Electricité Réseau Distribution France (ERDF) 
Electricité de France (EDF) 
NGOs Comité de Liaison des Energies Renouvelables (CLER)  
Association négaWatt 
Consumer groups Union des Syndicats de l’Immobilier (UNIS)  
Association des Responsables de Copropriétés (UNARC)  
Fédération Nationale des Usagers de Transports (FNAUT) 
Banking and finance 
sector 
Groupe BPCE  
Caisse des Dépots et Consignation – Climat 
Trade unions, business 
federations 
FNSEA  
Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (CFDT)  
Fédération Française du Bâtiment (FFB) 
Syndicat des Energies Renouvelables (SER) 
Public sector, state Ademe  
Plan Urbanisme Construction Architecture (PUCA) de la Direction générale de 
l’Aménagement du Logement et de la Nature (DGALN / PUCA) 
Direction Générale de l’Energie et du Climat (DGEC) 
 
  
1. Appendix: Imaclim-R-France description 
Imaclim-R-France is a computable general-equilibrium model belonging to the Imaclim family of 
models developed by Cired (Waisman et al, 2012a; Sassi et al, 2010; Crassous et al, 2006). It is a 
hybrid model which represents, year by year from 2004 to 2050, simultaneous changes in technology 
systems and the economy. Given the limitations of inter-temporal equilibrium models, which 
describe a stabilized economic trajectory, with optimal allocation of investments, Imaclim-R uses a 
recursive architecture to represent both the long-term growth engine (demographic growth and 
labour productivity) and the various forms of short-term friction which may arise (faulty forecasting, 
incomplete use of production factors, inertia at various levels – equipment, technology, preferences, 
trade or capital flows). Economic growth is thus described as a succession of static equilibriums, 
representing for each year an economic balance sheet (production, consumption, international 
trade) through a Walrasian equilibrium. The economy’s dynamic is represented by sector-specific 
models reflecting shifts in technology and stocks of production factors (capital, labour, natural 
resources), thus fuelling gradual growth between each static equilibrium (figure 1). 
Each static equilibrium does not describe the collective optimum of production taking account of the 
available technology. On the contrary the equilibrium is constrained in a sub-optimal situation by the 
inertia of equipment and the imperfect allocation of investments between sectors, entailing for 
example surplus production capacity in some sectors and under-capacity in others, thus causing 
tension on prices and volume, a lack of full employment due to insufficient flexibility in the labour 
market, distortions caused by previously existing taxes or indeed allowance for the behavioural 
routines of economic agents. The annual static equilibrium determines relative prices, wages, labour, 
value, physical flows, capacity utilization, profit rates and savings as a result of short term equilibrium 
conditions between demand and supply on all markets, including energy.  
Utility-maximizing households base their consumption choices on both income and time constraints; 
the former is the sum of wages, capital returns and transfers whereas the latter controls the total 
time spent in transportation.  
Firms adapt their short term production considering fixed input–output coefficients (the average of 
techniques embodied in their capital stock) and decreasing static returns when capacity approaches 
saturation. Producers are assumed to operate under short-term constraints of a fixed maximal 
production capacity, defined as the maximum level of physical output achievable with the equipment 
built and accumulated previously. In this context the only margin of freedom of producers is to adjust 
the utilisation rate of capacities according to relative market prices of input and output taking into 
account increasing costs when the production capacities utilisation rate approaches one. This 
represents a different paradigm from usual production specifications, since the capital factor is not 
always fully utilized. They determine their prices with a margin rate over production costs (mark-up) 
to capture the effect of imperfect competition.  
Producers operate in static equilibria with a fixed input of labour per unit of output. This labour 
input, corresponding to labour productivity, evolves between two-yearly equilibria following 
exogenous trends of labour productivity. Three of the model features explain the possibility of 
underutilization of labour as a production factor, and thus of unemployment. First, rigidity of real 
wages, represented by a wage curve can prevent wages falling to their market-clearing level. Put 
another way, wages are adjusted instantaneously to the economic context in static equilibrium, but 
not in an optimal manner. Second, in static equilibrium, the fixed technologies (Leontief coefficients, 
even for labour input) prevent substitution between factors in the short run. Third, the installed 
productive capital is not mobile across sectors, which creates rigidities in the reallocation of 
production between sectors when relative prices change. The aggregate wage curve links real wage 
level to unemployment rate. This representation relies on the fact that that unemployment 
represents an outside threat that leads workers to accept lower wages when the threat is important. 
The dynamics of the economy is governed by endogenous descriptions of capital accumulation and 
technical change. Capital accumulation is given by firms’ investment, households’ savings, and 
international capital flows. The across-sector distribution of investments is governed by expectations 
on sector profitability and technical conditions as described in sector-specific reduced forms of 
technology-rich models. Aggregate capital accumulation is controlled by exogenous saving rates and 
Imaclim-R-France represents investment decisions under imperfect foresight. Imperfect foresight is a 
consequence of uncertainty about future relative prices, final demand and investments profitability, 
other non-energy prices (land and real estate) and non-economic determinants of public decisions in 
transportation and urban planning. At a given date, agents have limited information about the future 
and shape their expectations on the basis of past and current trends (adaptive expectations). Under 
such semi-myopic foresight, installed capital resulting from past investment decisions may not be 
adapted to future economic settings. However, it cannot be renewed overnight due to inertias and 
acts as a constraint on the adaptability to variations of economic conditions (activity levels and 
prices). Between two static equilibria, technical choices are flexible but they modify only at the 
margin the input-output coefficients and labour productivity ambodied in existing equipment 
vintages that result from past technical choices. This general putty-clay assumption is critical to 
represent the inertia in technical systems. 
The economy is broken down into 13 sectors: energy (crude oil, refined oil, gas, coal, electricity), 
transport (road transport of goods, shipping by sea and inland waters, air transport, collective 
transport for passengers), construction, energy-intensive industry, agriculture and services. Energy is 
represented in values and physical quantities enabling the respective roles of each energy sector to 
be isolated, as well as their interaction with the rest of the economy. The use of physical variables 
(number of motor vehicles, collective dwellings or individual houses, annual energy efficiency of 
technologies, etc.) enables rigorous integration of sector-specific data related to the impact of 
economic incentives on final demand and technology systems, and dialogue with non-modellers.  
The sector specific modules represent the evolution of technical coefficients resulting from agents’ 
microeconomic decisions on technological choices, given the limits imposed by the innovation 
possibility frontier. They embed sector-based information of economies of scale, learning-by-doing 
mechanisms and saturation in efficiency progress, and expert views about the asymptotes on 
ultimate technical potentials, the impact of incentives, and the role of market or institutional 
imperfections. The new investment choices and technical coefficients are then sent back to the static 
module in the form of updated production capacities and input–output coefficients to calculate the 
t+1 equilibrium. 
This structure comes to adopt a standard putty-clay representation with fixed technical content of 
installed capital, which allows distinguishing between short-term rigidities and long-term flexibilities. 
